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For the post-Kyoto period, Turkey strongly emphasizes the establishment of national emission trading
system by 2015 and its integration with the EU ETS along its accession process to the EU. In this paper, we
study the mechanisms of adjustment and economic welfare consequences of various ETS regimes that
Turkey considers to apply by 2020, i.e. regional ETS and international trading within the EU ETS. We
conduct our analysis under the current EU 20–20–20 emission target, 20%, and also under its revised
version, 30%. We find that Turkey has economic gains from linking with the EU ETS under the 20% cap, in
comparison to the domestic ETSs. Despite the EU's welfare loss under linkage in comparison to the case
where Turkey has domestic abatement efforts, it still prefers linking as it increases economic well being
compared to the case where Turkey does not abate. Under 30% cutback, Turkey has critical output loss
under linkage due to high abatement burden on the EU, while the EU is better off as it passes some of its
abatement burden to Turkey. Therefore, emission quotas and their allocation across the ETS and non ETS
sectors become highly critical in distributing the overall economic gains from bilateral trading.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Following its removal from the Kyoto Protocol's Annex B list,
Turkey did not follow any official emission reduction targets over
the period, 2008 and 2012. For the post-Kyoto period, the Ministry
of Environment and Urbanization (MEU) delivered Turkey's
national vision within the scope of climate change in the National
Climate Change Action Plan: 2011–2023 (Ministry of Environment
and Urbanization, 2011). Within this document, Turkey's objec-
tives are stated as becoming a country fully integrating climate
change related objectives into its development policies, improving
energy efficiency, increasing the use of renewable energy sources,
and decreasing its emissions. In stabilizing CO2 emissions, thell rights reserved.
çum).Action Plan strongly emphasizes the establishment of national
emission trading system in Turkey by 2015 and its integration with
the existing and new global and regional carbon markets. Turkey
has also showed its determination in participating in global carbon
markets with the opening of the Environment Chapter as part of
the EU enlargement process. Turkey is expected to integrate with
the EU ETS along its accession process to join the EU. Besides
setting the international political agenda, as being world's largest
international carbon market, the EU ETS provides a natural venue
for Turkey in establishing its national permit market and a
potential partner for international carbon trading.
Having started in 2005 with a trial period, the EU ETS
completed its second phase during 2008–2012, and is at the onset
of its third phase between 2013 and 2020, compatible with the EU
20–20–20 targets (European Commission, 2008). For the post-
Kyoto period, the EU strongly supports an effective global carbon
market and encourages establishing direct links between the
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neighboring the EU, together with the candidate and potential
candidate countries, are stated as the most potential trading
partners (European Commission, 2009).
Bottom-up linking of cap-and-trade schemes are highly desir-
able as it enhances price equalization across the linked schemes
resulting in reduced aggregate abatement costs compared to
ex ante abatement costs (Haites, 2001; Blyth and Bosi, 2003). In
addition, both Turkey and the EU are supposed to benefit from the
proper functioning of the carbon market due to increased liquidity
and decreased price volatility (Baron and Bygrave, 2002). Never-
theless, overall efficiency gains do not necessarily translate into
regional efficiency gains. Linking the EU ETS with the Turkish
national permit market can have various distributional impacts,
which strongly depend upon the design of permit trading scheme,
existing distortions in the economies, carbon intensity of the
economies, and further on the terms of trade effects that the
regions are exposed to via international trade. Therefore, the
regional efficiency gains should be analyzed in a way that accounts
for these various price and income effects.
Despite incentives provided in the political background, there
remain many challenges that both Turkey and the European Union
face in formalizing their post-2012 abatement strategies based on
permit trading. Previous modeling efforts on the Turkish abate-
ment strategies against greenhouse gas emissions have exclusively
focused on applications of taxation in the Turkish economy in
isolation from the global economy. Telli et al. (2008) and Vural
(2009) concentrated on the taxation of energy use as instruments
of carbon dioxide abatement while Kumbaroglu (2003) focused on
the taxation of sulfur emissions. In a more recent study by Aydin
and Acar (2010), the economic impacts of unilateral carbon
taxation in Turkey are investigated under the case of Turkey's
accession to the European Union.
The economic aspects of bottom up linking of the EU ETS with
other cap-and-trade systems have been assessed in various model
frameworks. In their theoretical study, Eyckmans and Hagem
(2011) show that the EU countries can benefit from the bottom
up linking of regional cap-and-trade systems in case of certain
trade agreements. They test their hypotheses in using numerical
simulation methods across EU and China for 2015. In another
study, Anger (2008) studies linking the EU-ETS with the newly
emerging market schemes beyond Europe, i.e. Japan, Canada, the
US and the OECD Pacific countries. Their numerical analysis shows
that linking the EU-ETS with the emerging permit markets induces
minor economic benefits for the EU, while the economic impacts
for the non-EU countries can vary depending on the nature of
domestic structural differences and prevalent inefficiencies. The
dependence of the economic impacts to the structure of allowa-
nce allocation in the linking permit trading schemes is further
analyzed in Anger (2009).
Thus, there is a gap in the previous literature in addressing the
economic impacts of Turkey's abatement policies and bottom-up
linking of the EU ETS with the emerging Turkish permit marketTable 1
Key indicators of Turkey.
Source: IEA (2011a).
1990 1995 2000
CO2 (Mt of CO2) 126.91 152.66 200.56
TPES (Mtoe) 52.76 61.55 76.35
GDP PPP (billion 2000 USD) 411.06 481.43 589.24
Population (millions) 55.12 59.76 64.26
CO2/TPES (t CO2 per TJ) 57.5 59.2 62.7
CO2/GDP PPP (kg CO2 per 2000 USD) 0.31 0.32 0.34
CO2/population (t CO2 per capita) 2.3 2.55 3.12during the post-Kyoto period. This paper aims to fill this gap and
analyze the unilateral use of emission trading schemes in Turkey
as part of its contribution to the international climate change
mitigation efforts. It further investigates the economic impacts of
linkage provisions on both the EU and Turkey, which is planned to
take place as part of the EU's enlargement policies in the post-2012
period.
To this end, we build a multi-regional, multi-sectoral applied
general equilibrium model in order to study the economic impact
of Turkey's market-based abatement policies on the respective
economies. Our analysis shows that the EU prefers that Turkey
abates at home rather than not, while Turkey finds domestic
abatement costly. However, Turkey can alleviate some of these
costs by bilateral trading within the EU ETS. The economic gains
out of permit trading are highly dependent on the total emission
targets and their allocation across sectors. Our analysis further
suggests that in the case of an increase in the EU's emission target,
Turkey would not prefer to trade permits with the EU but rather
stick to domestic abatement policies.
Under 20% cutback, Turkey has economic gains under bilateral
trading within the EU ETS in comparison to unilateral trading
schemes. Although the EU has certain level of welfare loss under
bilateral trading in comparison to the case where Turkey has
domestic abatement efforts, it still prefers bilateral trading as it
increases economic well being compared to the case where Turkey
does not abate. However, under 30% cutback, Turkey has critical
output losses under bilateral trading due to high abatement
burden on the EU. On the other hand, the EU favors bilateral
trading as it passes some of its abatement burden to Turkey.
The following pages of the paper are organized as follows. In
Section 2, we provide key environmental and economic data to
portray Turkey's standing in comparison to the EU countries. In
Section 3, the model structure and calibration strategy are laid out,
together with the forward calibration procedure used in compara-
tive static analysis. In Section 4, we describe the scenario runs and
discuss the computational results. Section 5 summarizes our
findings and concludes.2. Key environmental and economic indicators
Over the period between 1990 and 2009, Turkey's GDP has
shown a growing, yet highly volatile trend with a cumulative
expansion of 92%. Within the same period, Turkey has also
experienced a rapid increase in its total primary energy supply
(TPES). Table 1 reports this cumulative increase as 85.1%.
Data supplied by the IEA (2011a) and OECD (2011) reveal that
total primary energy supply of Turkey highly depends on coal and
peat with 32%, on natural gas with 30%, and on crude oil and oil
products with 27%. The composition of TPES has been more stable
since 2005, and yet, the share of renewable resources remains
fairly low, around 4% for hydro, 5% for biofuels, and 2% for
geothermal and solar resources. As coal, peat, oil and natural gas2005 2007 2008 2009 Change 90–09 (%)
216.36 265 263.53 256.31 102.00
84.38 100.01 98.5 97.66 85.10
736.17 823.66 829.09 789.08 92
68.58 70.26 71.08 71.9 30.40
61.2 63.3 63.9 62.7 9.10
0.29 0.32 0.32 0.32 5.20
3.15 3.77 3.71 3.57 54.80
Table 2
Key indicators of the European Union.
Source: IEA (2011a).
EU 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 Change 90–09 (%)
CO2 (Mt of CO2) 4051.9 3847.5 3831.2 3978.9 3941.9 3868.2 3576.8 −11.7
TPES (Mtoe) 1348.5 1406.2 1487 1565.2 1538.6 1536.4 1459.1 8.2
GDP PPP (billion 2000 USD) 8556.4 9163.0 10591.8 11667.3 12445.5 12537.9 12007.6 40.2
Population (millions) 472.9 478.7 482.9 492.1 496.4 498.7 500.4 5.8
CO2/TPES (t CO2 per TJ) 59.1 56.1 54.3 53.4 53.6 52.8 51.6 −12.8
CO2/GDP PPP (kg CO2 per 2000 USD) 0.47 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.3 −37.0
CO2/population (t CO2 per capita) 8.57 8.04 7.93 8.09 7.94 7.76 7.15 −16.6
G.A. Olçum, E. Yeldan / Energy Policy 60 (2013) 764–774766are energy sources that are rich in carbon contents, it is not
surprising to see the highly significant rise in Turkey's CO2
emissions between 1990 and 2009. Turkey's CO2 emissions
increase from 126.91 Mt CO2 in 1990 to 256.31 Mt CO2 in 2009,
corresponding to a cumulative 102% rise. Within the same period
the European Union experienced a decline of 11.7% in its total
emission level, despite the 40.2% cumulative expansion in its GDP
(Table 2).
By 2009, with per capita CO2 emissions of 3.57 tones, Turkey
lies below the EU average of 7.15 tones. However, it is crucial to
note the difference in the movements of per capita CO2 emissions.
While Turkey has been experiencing 54.8% growth in its per capita
CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2009, the EU experienced a
successful decline in its per capita CO2 emissions by around 16.6%.
Turkey's CO2 emissions per US$ GDP was realized as 0.32 for
2009, which is slightly higher than the EU ratio of 0.30. This seems
to be the constant trend since 2005. Just like the trend in per
capita CO2 emissions, between 1990 and 2009, CO2 emissions per
US$ GDP also show an increase around 5.2% in Turkey, and a 37%
decrease in the EU countries.
The differences in the above findings are mainly due to the
differences in energy policies. It is clear that Turkey is experien-
cing highly emission intensive growth. IMF (2012) projects the
annual growth rate of Turkish economy for the period between
2012 and 2017 as 3.7% on average, while IEA (2011b) projects it as
4.0% on average. Therefore, in the long run, it is inevitable that
Turkey will face rapid increase in its CO2 emissions along with the
challenge of stabilizing its CO2 emissions.
On the contrary, the EU countries pursue energy policies that
are more reliant on less emission intensive inputs. In addition to
renewable energy promotion and energy efficiency improvement
policies, the EU has implemented a wide use of permit trading to
increase the cost efficiency of its climate change mitigation
policies and also to generate revenue for fostering economic
growth in the long run.
The amount of allowances traded in the EU ETS has been
steadily increasing since 2005. In 2010, the amount is recorded as
6789 Mt CO2 equiv. of allowances at a market value of $134 billion.
In 2011, the number of traded allowances increased to 7853 Mt
CO2 equiv. with a market value of $148 billion (World Bank, 2012).
The carbon price in the second phase has been relatively more
stable. The allowances were traded at €25/tCO2 for much of 2008,
and in a range between €13/tCO2 and €17/tCO2 in the period
between 2009 and 2011 (World Bank, 2012). Starting with 2012,
the carbon price has reached to very low levels below €10/tCO2, to
around €6/tCO2 (European Commission, 2012). This decrease is
due to the growing surplus of allowances, which mainly stems
from the great recession depressing emissions more than the
anticipated levels and the expansion in the use of renewable
technologies along with the increased availability of offset credits.
As the surplus is anticipated to persist for most of the third phase,
the Commission has launched a debate on some structural
changes for the proper functioning of the EU ETS (EuropeanCommission, 2012). Increasing the EU's emission reduction target
for 2020 to 30% below the 1990 levels, bringing more sectors into
the EU ETS, limiting the use of offset credits and introducing the
use of cost-containment mechanisms have currently been
debated.3. The analytical framework
3.1. Model structure and base year calibration
In order to assess the economic impacts of Turkey's abatement
policies, an applied general equilibrium model of commodity and
permit trading is used, which is structurally comparable to the
model used in (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2010). The model has a
multi-region and multi-sector setting which builds up on the GTAP
7 data set representing the world economy at a global level for the
reference year, 2004 (Badri and Walmsley, 2008). Akin Olcum
(2012) gives a more detailed algebraic exposition of the model
structure.
For the specific requirements of the current policy analysis, we
aggregate the GTAP 7 data base into a more compact dataset. The
energy goods specified are coal, crude oil, natural gas, refined oil
products and electricity. These are the main driving forces behind
CO2 emissions created through economic activities. In any abate-
ment policy analysis, the CO2 intensity of sectors together with the
technological possibilities of substitution between energy goods,
are crucial in determining the magnitude of abatement and
welfare changes. Taking into account all these, energy goods are
identified and treated separately. Consequently, the energy inten-
sive sectors are featured as: chemical industry, non-metallic
minerals, iron and steel industry, non-ferrous metals, mining,
paper-pulp-print and transport sectors. The remaining sectors
are all other manufacturing industries, together with the “other
economy”.
Regarding regional disaggregation, Turkey is treated separately,
while 27 European Union countries are all involved in the “EU”
aggregate. All other regions are aggregated within the region “Rest
of the World”.
All markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. There is a
single representative agent in each economy who owns the
primary factors of production, i.e. capital, labor and resources.
Labor and capital are assumed to be mobile across sectors within
regions but internationally immobile. Resource inputs are sector-
specific. All production factors are supplied inelastically in the
factor markets.
Production activity is captured via nested constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) functions, while technologies of extractive and
non-extractive industries are modeled separately. For the non-
extractive production technologies, energy goods, non-energy
goods and factor inputs are all aggregated within separate CES
nests. At the top level, these aggregates again trade off with each
other, subject to a certain elasticity of substitution. Resource
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resources and an aggregate of all other inputs at the top level using
a CES function. This specification acts as a capacity constraint on
the supply of the extractive industries. The other inputs are a
Leontief composite of materials and the primary factor value
added aggregate. Producers pay value added taxes over factor
inputs, sales taxes over intermediate inputs, and production taxes.
Imperfectly competitive foreign demand approach of product
heterogeneity is used to model bilateral trade flows in the model
(Armington, 1969). All intermediate and final goods in the com-
modity markets are represented as Armingtonian composite
goods, which are “produced” via imperfectly substituting domestic
goods and imports. These activities are modeled via CES functions
that aggregate domestic outputs with import composites of the
same variety of the good, subject to a given elasticity of substitu-
tion. Export activities are also modeled subject to imperfect
transformability between exports and domestic sales, which are
expressed by constant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions.
Each bilateral commodity trade flow is also subject to certain trade
margin flows in fixed proportions. For each region, the financing of
the current account deficit/surplus is exogenously set at base year
values.
In the model formulation, there is not an explicit government
unit. The representative agent of each region acts both as a
household unit and also as a governmental unit. Therefore, all
tax revenues accrue to the representative agent. Consumption
demand of the representative agent is modeled via two-level
nested CES functions. At the top nest, energy and non energy
composites trade off, while at the lower level, within separate
nests, energy goods and non-energy goods trade off with the same
type of good. Demand for investment good and demand for public
provision are set exogenously at their base year levels. Hence,
savings adjust endogenously.
The underlying reason for using this Kaldorian closure combin-
ing fixed foreign savings, fixed real investment and fixed real
public consumption is to be able to explore the pure welfare
effects of alternative policies in a comparative static general
equilibrium framework. Using the Kaldorian closure minimizes
the risk of biased welfare effects that would otherwise occur with
endogenous foreign savings and real investment in the upcoming
periods. In addition to that, since the model does not capture the
direct effects of public provision on household's welfare, it is also
preferred to use government consumption as fixed exogenously.
In order to include a market for trading permits, the national
(regional) commodity trade markets are further expanded by
integrating emission creation mechanism and giving incentives
to trade permits. In the model, trading is only allowed for CO2
permits. In each regional economy, CO2 emissions are created by
the use of fossil fuels, i.e. coal, oil and natural gas. The CO2 emitters
that are required to hold allowances in equal amounts to their
total emissions are taken as the downstream entities, i.e. users of
dirty inputs. Hence, the production and consumption units using
fossil fuels are specified as the permit demanders, while the
representative agent is the unit supplying the permits to the CO2
emitters. The users of fossil fuels are subject to certain CO2 quotas
which are fixed exogenously. Allowances, in equal amounts to the
target CO2 emission levels, are supplied by the representative
agent. Auctioning is used for allocating allowances to the emitters.
In a theoretical paper, Montgomery (1972) proves that the equili-
brium allocation of permits, along with their market-determined
prices and aggregate costs of abatement are independent of the
initial allocation of permits. In what follows, under assumptions of
perfectly competitive markets and zero transaction costs, we
numerically derive the permit price as the respective shadow
price of the aggregate CO2 quota. The corresponding price is the
price at which marginal abatement costs are equalized across allregions and sectors involved in permit trading. The equilibrium
allocation of permits and aggregate abatement costs are derived
accordingly.
In the model, permit trading is modeled both at the inte-
rnational and regional levels. That is to say it is possible for regions
to run their regional cap-and-trade systems simultaneously inte-
grating with the international cap-and-trade systems. Further-
more, the model also allows for market segmentation, in the
sense that certain sectors are allowed to trade permits with each
other. The decision regarding the grouping of sectors is on each
region's own initiative.
3.2. Forward calibration
For any given target year, the corresponding business-as-usual
(BAU) scenario is calibrated on top of the base year economies in
2004. In formulating the BAU scenario, we use the forward
calibration techniques as implemented in Böhringer and
Rutherford (2010). While doing so, we made use of regional
projections on GDP growth rates, population growth rates, energy
demands, and CO2 emissions for the target year. The projection
data from the US Energy Information Agency—International
Energy Outlook (IEO)—are used for the BAU calibration of the
aggregate economies in the model, i.e. the EU and the ROW
(EIA, 2010). GTAP7inGAMS routines are used in aggregating the
IEO country groupings in line with the region profile used in this
study (Rutherford, 2011). Since the IEO data set loses its accuracy
in more disaggregated forms of some regional compositions, it is
further complemented with more detailed information from the
International Energy Agency (IEA) for the BAU calibration of the
Turkish economy (IEA, 2011b).4. Policy scenarios and analysis
In this section, we now turn to the design of environmental and
economic policy framework in which we will investigate the
potential welfare effects of Turkey's application of various permit
trading schemes. The target year is set as 2020 and the main focus
is on the use of market-based environmental policies that Turkey
and the EU are committed to apply within this period. In this
regard, policies promoting the use of renewable energy and offset
credits are not explicitly modeled and analyzed. Nevertheless,
non-price driven improvements in the energy intensities of the
respective economies are assumed to take place and represented
by the use of autonomous energy efficiency indices (Lee et al.,
1994; Paltsev et al., 2005).
As a first step in our policy analysis, the EU is assumed to stick
to the emission reduction target of 20% relative to the 1990 levels,
which is set by the current EU 20–20–20 targets. This total target is
expected to be achieved through emission reduction levels of 21%
for the EU ETS sectors and 10% for non-ETS sectors, compared to
their 2005 levels (European Commission, 2008). In the second
part, we investigate the economic impacts in case of an increase
in the EU's emission reduction target to 30% below 1990 levels,
which is currently under consideration for sustaining the proper
functioning of the EU ETS during the third phase (European
Commission, 2012).
Since Turkey has not yet engaged officially in any kind of legal
sanctions for CO2 emissions, the total emission cutback ratio and
its distribution across sectors are still not clear. Additionally, the
sectors which are planned to trade permits and the ones which are
likely to exercise other market-based policies are not specified,
either. Therefore, in formulating Turkey's policy scenarios, we stick
to signals of political realism and chose to stay in line with the
European criteria.
Table 3
Emission reduction requirements for the European Union.
Source: Authors' computations.













Total 15 15.1 25.7 25.7
Table 4
Emission reduction requirements for Turkey.
Source: Authors' computations.
Nominal targets Effective targets
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
ETS Sectors 10 15 20 24.2 28.4 32.6
Non ETS sectors 10 15 20 8.8 13.8 18.9
Total 10 15 20 16.9 21.5 26.1
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In all of the counterfactual simulations, the sectors involved in
the EU ETS are specified as electricity, refined oil, chemical, iron
and steel, non-metallic minerals, non-ferrous metal and paper-
pulp-print industries. Table 3 summarizes the nominal reduction
targets of the EU stated relative to 2005 levels, and also the
effective reduction targets, which are expressed relative to 2020
levels.1
For the EU, the nominal reduction rates are not translated into
significantly higher effective reduction rates. There is even a
decrease in the cutback ratio of the non ETS sectors. This is mainly
due to low economic growth level, which is projected as 1.8%
annual on average between 2004 and 2020, and high improve-
ment percentages in energy efficiency levels, as given in the IEO
2010 projections.
In terms of market-based environmental policies, we simulate
and analyze the following strategies that Turkey can choose to





meNOACT: Turkey does not take any abatement action.
 C_rETS: This scenario simulates a comprehensive permit trad-
ing scheme, where Turkey sets binding CO2 emission quota
covering all CO2 emitting sectors. Indeed, under the current
model formulation, the C_rETS scenario also corresponds to a
uniform national CO2 tax policy. S_rETS: In a segmented emission trading scheme, Turkey is
assumed to segment its permit market into two main parts, i.e.
ETS sectors and non ETS sectors.2 The respective emission
reduction targets for these sector groups are set in proportion
to their 2004 emission levels. While the ETS sectors are
assumed to trade permits with each other, the non ETS sectors
are subject to separate abatement policies. EU_ETS: This scenario extends the S_rETS scenario, in a way that
the Turkish ETS sectors are assumed to trade permits within
the EU ETS and the non ETS sectors are subject to other
domestic abatement policies. The emission reduction targets
for the ETS and non ETS sectors are set in proportion to their
2004 levels.
Among the possible cutback ratios that Turkey is likely to apply
by 2020, we simulate 10%, 15%, and 20% reduction rates, relative to
2004 levels. Table 4 reports the nominal and effective reduction
targets with respect to 2004 and 2020, respectively. As opposed to
the EU, Turkey's total CO2 emission level increases significantly,1 In case of an increase in the EU's emission reduction target to 30%, the
ribution of allowances across the ETS and non ETS sectors is not officially set,
. Hence, we assume that the existing distribution will be preserved under the
cutback ratio, as well.
2 ETS sectors are assumed to be the same with the European ETS sectors, i.e.
tricity, refined oil, chemical, iron and steel, non-metallic minerals, non-ferrous
tals and paper-pulp-print industries.resulting in higher effective reduction requirements with respect
to the BAU emission levels in 2020. If we take into account high
economic growth and low energy efficiency improvement projec-
tions for Turkey, according to the IEA (2011b), the high differen-
tials between nominal and effective reduction rates should not be
surprising.
4.2. Policy analysis under the current EU 20–20–20 targets
In this first part of our analysis, we investigate the economic
impacts when the EU applies the emission reduction target of 20%.
Under the NOACT scenario, the European production sectors
experience a considerable rise in their marginal costs of produc-
tion. The permit price in the EU ETS realizes as $17.73/tCO2, while
the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of the non ETS sectors realizes
as $84.19/tCO2 (Table 5). This increase further results in loss of
competitiveness with consequent in the production levels across
the European industries. The decrease in the EU's aggregate
economic activity is measured as 0.24% compared to the BAU
scenario. Following the contraction in its economy, the EU suffers
from welfare losses. As Fig. 1 gives, the EU's welfare loss under the
NOACT scenario is 0.38% relative to the BAU level.3
Increasing and diverging marginal costs between the European
ETS and non ETS sectors under the EU 20–20–20 targets, is also
evident in other studies. For 2020, using Gemini-E3, Bernard and
Vielle (2009) calculate the MAC of the ETS sectors and non ETS
sectors as 72 €/tCO2 and 194 €/tCO2, respectively. They state that
the higher MACs for the European sectors lead to higher welfare
loss for the EU, which is calculated as 1% with respect to the BAU
scenario.4 In their applied general equilibrium analysis, Böhringer
et al. (2009) find that, under 20% reduction target, the EU suffers
fromwelfare losses around 0.3% by 2020 in comparison to the BAU
path (See footnote 4). The MACs are considerably lower than the
ones from the Gemini-E3 model, i.e. 36 €/tCO2 for the ETS sectors
and 104 €/tCO2 for the non ETS sectors. The differences in the
MACs from these existing studies and the ones in our study should
be mainly attributed to the differences in the GDP and energy
efficiency growth projections, together with forecasts for energy
prices.
Abatement policies in the EU affect not only the domestic, but
also the international markets. As being one of the three biggest
users and importers of energy goods in the global economy, the
decrease in the EU's import demand for primary energy carriers
causes price adjustments both in the domestic and the world
markets. The cutback in international fossil fuel demand immedi-
ately reflects itself as depressed international fuel prices. While
the price of coal and natural gas decrease around 2% relative to the
BAU scenario, the decrease in the price of refined and crude oil is
around 0.8%. As narrated in similar occasions of Bohringer and3 Throughout this study, the change in economic welfare is measured as
Hicksian equivalent variation. This corresponds to the amount of income that is
necessary to compensate the representative agent for welfare changes, which
occurs as a result of economic policies.
4 The change in welfare is given in Hicksian Equivalent Variation.
Table 5
MACs in the EU under the current EU 20–20–20 targets ($ per ton of CO2).
Source: Authors' computations.
NOACT C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
ETS Sectors 17.73 17.76 17.77 17.78 17.76 17.77 17.78 17.9 18.24 18.59
















































Fig. 2. Welfare effects for Turkey under the current EU 20–20–20 targets.
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have negative or positive spillover effects on other non-abating
regions. As a fuel importer, Turkey benefits from decreasing fuel
price levels, and increases the use and imports of fossil fuels
(Table 11). Turkey's coal imports increases by 2.01%, crude oil
imports rises by 0.62%, while imports of natural gas and oil
increases by 0.62% and 0.36%, respectively, compared to their
BAU levels. Due to cheaper primary energy imports, the secondary
energy sectors, i.e. refined oil and electricity, increase their scales
of production (Table 9). Thus, electricity prices decrease in the
domestic market.
Consequently, cheaper energy prices ought to cause positive
scale effects on other non-energy sectors, as well. However, non-
energy sectors are exposed to various general equilibrium adjust-
ments mostly propelled by imperfect substitution and product
heterogeneity of traded goods. Depending on the interdependence
between regions via international trade, higher prices of exports,
together with decreasing import demand in the abating regions
may lead to negative scale effects on the production sectors in
non-abating trade partners. In Turkey's case, while transport
services, chemical and non-ferrous metals industries increase their
scales of production, export oriented industries, most of which are
the manufacturing industries, including iron and steel industry,
non-metallic minerals and textile industry, are all exposed to
negative scale effects (Table 9). The effect of decreasing import
demand from the EU and shifting trade patterns gradually under-
mine the positive scale effect stemming from depressed inte-
rnational fuel prices.
Despite the negative scale effects on export oriented industries,
the overall economic activity in Turkey increases compared to the
BAU scenario. Hence, Turkey achieves net welfare gains under the
NOACT scenario (Fig. 2).
When Turkey has comprehensive permit trading, there realizes
a unique permit price in Turkey, at the rate $19.9/tCO2 under 10%
cap. This rate increases in a nonlinear fashion as the cutback ratio
increases. Table 6 gives the permit price levels under 15% and 20%
quotas as $29.74 and $43.25, respectively. In comparison to (Aydin
and Acar, 2010), our MAC curves are found considerably steeper. In
their analysis when Turkey applies 45% cutback with respect to
2005, the permit price has been found as $45.92, which, in
contrast, is close to the price level under 20% cap with ourmodeling framework. Clearly, these differences are due both to
the differences of the methodology and the adjustment mechan-
isms therein modeled.
As Table 10 shows, most of the abatement is undertaken
by electricity, chemicals, iron and steel, non-metallic minerals,
manufacturing and other economy sectors. Additionally, due to
these negative scale effects on the economy, the other energy
sectors, i.e. coal, natural gas and oil face declines in their real
output levels relative to the BAU levels (see Tables 9 and 10
below). The contraction in these sectors continues to grow as the
cap increases. Hence, Turkey's aggregate economic activity under
the C_rETS scenario falls behind the levels under the NOACT and
BAU scenarios. As Fig. 2 shows, this causes welfare losses for
Turkey, which is quantified as 0.30% under 10% quota, relative to
the BAU level. The welfare loss further increases to 0.80% under
the 20% quota. In sum, the higher the cutback requirement, the
higher becomes the welfare loss.
The EU economy is affected by Turkey's abatement policies via
two separate channels. Firstly, the MACs of the European ETS and
non ETS sectors are subject to changes depending on Turkey's
abatement actions. Imperfect substitution in international trade
(the Armingtonian composite commodity structure) leads Turkey
to pass on some of its cost burden to its trading partners including
the EU. The other channel affecting the EU economy is the change
in competitiveness in both domestic and international markets
relative to the loss of competitiveness of the Turkish industries.
The ability of the EU to turn Turkey's disadvantage in international
competitiveness into gains is very much dependent on the
European production technologies and also on the degree of
openness to bilateral trade.
Under the C_rETS scenario, the permit price in the EU ETS
slightly increases from $17.73/tCO2 to $17.76, $17.77, $17.78 under
10%, 15% and 20% quota, respectively. It is mainly the foregone
opportunity of importing cheaper secondary energy carriers from
Turkey, which underlies the increase in the MACs of the European
sectors. The price level in the European non ETS market increases
from $84.19/tCO2 to $84.24 under the 10% quota and it further
reaches to $84.3, under the 20% quota.
Despite increasing marginal costs, the EU economy undergoes a
positive scale effect, which stems from increasing competitiveness
Table 6
MACs in Turkey under the current EU 20–20–20 targets ($ per ton of CO2).
Source: Authors' computations.
NOACT C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
ETS Sectors – 19.9 29.74 43.25 20.09 26.63 34.91 17.9 18.24 18.59
Non ETS sectors – 19.9 29.74 43.25 19.42 38.39 67.55 19.38 38.27 67.46
Table 7
MACs in the EU under the revised EU 20–20–20 targets ($ per ton of CO2).
Source: Authors' computations.
NOACT C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
ETS Sectors 34.12 34.16 34.17 34.19 34.16 34.17 34.18 33.06 33.64 34.23
Non ETS sectors 266.46 266.52 266.56 266.60 266.53 266.61 266.73 266.59 266.64 266.73
Table 8
MACs in Turkey under the revised EU 20–20–20 targets ($ per ton of CO2).
Source: Authors' computations.
NOACT C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS
10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20% 10% 15% 20%
ETS Sectors – 20.69 30.81 44.72 20.1 26.67 34.98 33.06 33.64 34.23
Non ETS sectors – 20.69 30.81 44.72 22.25 42.67 73.71 22.54 42.79 73.7
Table 9
Sectorial production, Turkey (billion 2004 USD).
Source: Authors' computations.
Turkey 10% 15% 20%
Sectorsa 2020 NOACT C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS
oil 8.027 8.072 7.939 7.941 7.946 7.875 7.846 7.865 7.789 7.709 7.745
gas 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.039
omn 4.564 4.559 4.523 4.522 4.526 4.508 4.514 4.529 4.490 4.505 4.532
tex 70.958 70.467 70.299 70.302 70.320 70.237 70.199 70.264 70.159 70.067 70.180
ppp 13.616 13.599 13.533 13.532 13.540 13.504 13.518 13.547 13.467 13.502 13.558
crp 24.426 24.450 23.732 23.725 23.801 23.424 23.532 23.815 23.032 23.305 23.838
nmm 18.091 18.064 17.783 17.780 17.810 17.673 17.718 17.826 17.540 17.650 17.850
i_s 30.243 30.180 29.402 29.395 29.478 29.084 29.198 29.506 28.688 28.975 29.550
nfm 2.321 2.334 2.007 2.005 2.036 1.883 1.922 2.036 1.735 1.829 2.038
ele 22.714 22.737 21.973 21.966 22.042 21.667 21.776 22.059 21.291 21.557 22.083
omf 121.397 120.605 120.546 120.550 120.550 120.550 120.501 120.498 120.572 120.474 120.460
col 1.036 1.024 0.795 0.795 0.807 0.740 0.742 0.781 0.688 0.694 0.759
cru 0.397 0.396 0.395 0.395 0.395 0.394 0.394 0.395 0.394 0.393 0.394
trn 94.515 95.527 95.300 95.315 95.288 95.162 94.909 94.813 94.960 94.271 94.091
aog 536.849 536.573 536.703 536.702 536.681 536.716 536.728 536.657 536.717 536.753 536.638
a Oil, refined oil products; gas, natural gas works; omn, mining; tex, textiles; ppp, paper and paper products; crp, chemicals; nmm, non-metallic minerals; i_s, iron and
steel; nfm, non-ferrous metals; ele, electricity; omf, other manufacturing; col, coal; cru, crude oil; trn, transport; aog, all other goods.
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scale effect on the EU economy becomes more significant as the
Turkish industries lose more of their competitiveness in the
international markets.
As summarized in Fig. 1, the positive scale effect on the
European economy reflects itself as increases in the EU's economic
welfare. Compared to the BAU case, the EU still suffers from
welfare loss, at a rate of around 0.377%. However, the loss is
strictly smaller than the one that the EU would suffer under the
NOACT scenario. Hence, in relative terms, the EU has some welfaregains when Turkey applies abatement policies countrywide and
this gain increases as Turkey applies stricter abatement targets.
Under the “partitioned permit trading scheme”, the ex-ante
distribution of allowances across the ETS and the non ETS sectors
distorts the Turkish permit market. Fig. 3 gives the difference
between the total allowances allocated to the ETS sectors under
the S_rETS and C_rETS scenarios. Under the C_rETS scenario, the
final allocation of permits across the sectors corresponds to the
efficient allocation. Hence, it is seen that, for the 10% cap, the ETS
sectors are slightly under-allocated by 0.167 Mt of CO2 under the
Table 10
Sectorial emissions, Turkey (Mt of CO2).
Source: Authors' computations.
Turkey 10% 15% 20%
Sectorsa 2020 NOACT C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS
oil 0.166 0.167 0.152 0.152 0.153 0.145 0.146 0.151 0.137 0.139 0.149
gas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
omn 0.370 0.371 0.270 0.272 0.272 0.245 0.227 0.227 0.220 0.191 0.190
tex 2.197 2.192 1.912 1.917 1.916 1.831 1.764 1.759 1.745 1.613 1.604
ppp 2.614 2.622 2.021 2.017 2.060 1.868 1.913 2.056 1.719 1.808 2.053
crp 11.313 11.364 9.250 9.237 9.391 8.687 8.855 9.383 8.123 8.467 9.378
nmm 12.447 12.496 8.775 8.753 9.015 7.829 8.106 8.995 6.918 7.461 8.977
i_s 5.338 5.354 4.211 4.204 4.288 3.907 3.997 4.284 3.602 3.787 4.282
nfm 2.318 2.339 1.717 1.713 1.761 1.539 1.593 1.759 1.354 1.467 1.758
ele 81.690 82.054 61.927 61.810 63.202 56.920 58.394 63.114 52.092 54.991 63.034
omf 4.569 4.565 3.252 3.273 3.270 2.922 2.687 2.676 2.604 2.206 2.189
col 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
cru 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
trn 28.895 29.253 28.773 28.786 28.783 28.539 28.326 28.317 28.224 27.653 27.635
aog 26.198 26.310 21.310 21.389 21.374 19.985 19.025 18.974 18.676 16.953 16.953
a Oil, refined oil products; gas, natural gas works; omn, mining; tex, textiles; ppp, paper and paper products; crp, chemicals; nmm, non-metallic minerals; i_s, iron and
steel; nfm, non-ferrous metals; ele, electricity; omf, other manufacturing; col, coal; cru, crude oil; trn, transport; aog, all other goods.
Table 11
Change in fuel consumption in Turkey (relative to the BAU level).
Source: Authors' computations.
Turkey 10% 15% 20%
Fossil fuel NOACT C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS C_rETS S_rETS EU_ETS
Oil 0.546 −1.206 −1.184 −1.120 −2.054 −2.440 −2.197 −3.191 −4.245 −3.785
Gas 0.606 −3.156 −3.155 −2.854 −5.029 −5.029 −3.872 −7.521 −7.456 −5.217
Coal 0.492 −30.512 −30.527 −28.942 −38.106 −37.852 −32.542 −45.259 −44.621 −35.710












Fig. 3. Allowance allocation to the ETS sectors in Turkey.












Fig. 4. Allowance allocation to the non-ETS sectors in Turkey.
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what they would abate under the comprehensive trading scheme.
Following this, MAC of the ETS sectors increases to $20.09 from
$19.9/tCO2. As given in Fig. 4, the non ETS sectors are over-
allocated under the S_rETS scenario. Thus, MAC of the non ETS
sectors becomes $19.42/tCO2. The abatement cost at the margin
decreases compared to the C_rETS case.
Under 15% and 20% caps, over allocation is observed in the ETS
sectors, while the non ETS sectors are given less amounts of
allowances in comparison to the efficient allocation. The efficiency
loss arising from over-allocating the ETS sectors and under-
allocating the non ETS sectors is further reflected in the MACs.
As Table 6 reports, the “allowance price” drops down to $26.63 and
$34.91 in the ETS market under 15% and 20% quota, respectively. In
the non ETS market, MAC increases to $38.39 and $67.55 under
15% and 20% quota, respectively.Segmenting the permit market basically causes shifts in sharing
the abatement cost burden across sectors. Under the 15% and 20%
caps, the ETS sectors shift some of their abatement duties to the
non ETS sectors. In contrast, under the 10% cap, the ETS sectors are
obliged to abate more, while the non ETS sectors are obliged to
abate less. The distortion arising from ex-ante allocation of
permits causes the Turkish economy to experience efficiency
losses in meeting its total abatement objectives. The higher the
cutback requirement, the higher is the cost burden on cleaner
industries, relative to the cost burden on energy intensive sectors.
The resulting high price differential between the MACs of the ETS
and the non ETS sectors lead to production efficiency losses, which
are further translated into losses in social welfare. As seen in Fig. 2
above, under the 10% quota, Turkey's economic loss is 0.30%, which
is almost the same as the one under the comprehensive trading
scheme. This is due to the fact that the decrease of the cost burden
on cleaner industries compensates for the increasing cost burden
G.A. Olçum, E. Yeldan / Energy Policy 60 (2013) 764–774772on energy industries as Turkey's sectors are highly dependent on
energy imports. However, the economic loss increases to 0.54%
and 0.88% under the 15% and 20% quotas, respectively. Hence, we
conclude that in comparison to the comprehensive permit market,
partitioned market structure results in more welfare loss.
In comparison to the NOACT scenario, the European Union is
positively affected when Turkey applies permit trading in a
partitioned market structure. Despite the increase in the MACs
of the ETS and non ETS sectors, the European industries expand
their market shares in the domestic and the Turkish markets.
Hence, the overall economic activity in the EU increases. Further-
more, the EU benefits more as the cutback ratio that Turkey
applies increases (Fig. 1).
In comparison with C_rETS scenario, the EU's total economic
activity level increases when Turkey applies 10% cap. Taking into
account the fact that MACs of European sectors do not change, it is
clear that this increase is mainly due to the efficiency loss in the
Turkish economy arising from market segmentation. In contrast,
under 15% and 20% quota, the EU is negatively affected by
interventions to the Turkish permit market. Total economic
activity decreases below its base level under the C_rETS scenario.
This decrease in the total output is mainly due to the relative
increase in the marginal production costs of the European sectors,
accompanied with the decreasing market share of the Turkish
domestic markets. Hence, as it is seen in Fig. 1, although the EU
enjoys more welfare gains under the S_rETS scenario, these gains
are slightly smaller in comparison to the levels under the com-
prehensive permit trading.
When the Turkish and the European ETSs integrate, the permit
price in the EU ETS increases from $17.73 to $17.90 under 10%
quota, to $18.24 under 15% quota and to $18.59 under 20% quota.
In comparison to the permit price levels prevailing in the regional
ETSs, the Turkish ETS sectors face considerable decrease in the
price level after integration. The price differential gets more
significant as the total cap increases. It is also crucial to note that
while permit price level in the regional ETSs are more volatile
against changes in the emission caps, the price level in the EU ETS
is less volatile.
As opposed to the Turkish ETS sectors, the European ETS
sectors face higher permit price levels after integration. This
increase is mainly because of the high level of MAC of the Turkish
ETS sectors, which are summarized in Table 6. The differences
between MACs provide Turkey additional incentives to buy per-
mits in the market place instead of abating at home, while the
European ETS sectors have an incentive to sell permits in exchange
of decreasing their emission levels. Thus, in the EU ETS market,
while the EU markets becomes a permit exporter, Turkey becomes
a permit importer and shifts some of its abatement cost burden to
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Fig. 5. Turkey's volume of permit imports under the current EU 20–20–20 targets.imports become 1.983 Mt of CO2 under 10% quota, 6.739 Mt of CO2
and 11.510 Mt of CO2 under 15% and 20% quota, respectively.
Permit imports increase as the cap increases due to increasing
level of MAC of the Turkish ETS sectors.
In comparison to the domestic ETSs, the output levels of the
Turkish ETS sectors increase following the decrease in their
marginal production costs (Table 9). In particular, they are the
sectors of secondary energy generation, iron and steel, non-ferrous
metals, chemicals and non-metallic minerals, which abate less
than the levels under the S_rETS scenario (Table 10). Due to the
decrease in the energy prices, the MAC of the non ETS sectors also
tends to decrease. Thus, aggregate economic activity in Turkey
increases. Hence, as portrayed in Fig. 1, in comparison to the
S_rETS and the C_rETS scenarios, Turkey unambiguously enjoys
welfare gains from integration.
Due to the increase in the permit price level, the European ETS
sectors decrease their scales of production. While the Turkish ETS
sectors are expanding their scales of production at a cost of
increasing CO2 emissions, the EU abates more at a cost of
decreasing the production levels of the ETS sectors. The spillover
effects are not limited just to the ETS sectors. As Table 5 docu-
ments, the MAC of the non ETS sectors also increases under the
EU_ETS scenario. The MAC level of the European non ETS sectors,
compared to the NOACT scenario, increase from $84.19 to $84.23
with 10% quota, to $84.27 with 15% quota, and to $84.33 with 20%
quota. Under the S_rETS scenario, regardless of the total cap, MAC
is higher and under the C_rETS scenario, it is lower. This is mainly
due to the fact that the European industries become highly
dependent on secondary energy imports from Turkey as a result
of the EU's abatement policies. Due to expensive electricity
imports from Turkey under the S_rETS scenario, the permit price
in the European non ETS market increases more compared to the
C_rETS scenario. When Turkey integrates with the EU ETS market,
the expansion in Turkey's secondary energy sectors lead to
cheaper import prices; hence the MAC of the European non ETS
sectors decrease compared to the S_rETS scenario.
As displayed in Fig. 1, despite the negative scale effects arising
from increasing price levels, the EU still finds it welfare improving
when Turkey integrates with the EU ETS compared to the NOACT
scenario. This is partly due to the increase in international
competitiveness of the European sectors, and partly due to the
disposition of the auctioning revenues. However, as Turkey starts
to impose stricter emission caps, these welfare gains tend to
diminish. In this regard, from the EU's perspective, the cap that
Turkey imposes and the manner it is allocated across the ETS and
the non-ETS sectors becomes highly critical. On the other hand, in
comparison to the S_rETS and C_rETS scenarios, the European
Union finds the EU_ETS scenario as welfare reducing. This is
mainly due to the burden sharing. The increase in auctioning
revenues that European economy enjoys under the EU_ETS


























Fig. 6. Welfare effects for the EU under the revised EU 20–20–20 targets.
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Fig. 8. The EU's volume of permit trading under the revised EU 20–20–20 targets.4.3. Policy analysis under the revised EU 20–20–20 targets
In the second part of our analysis, we assume that the EU
increases the emission reduction target for 2020 to 30% and
conduct our economic analysis accordingly.
Following the increase in the emission reduction target, the
MAC of the European ETS sectors increases and settles within a
range between $33/tCO2 and $35/tCO2 (Table 7). The MAC of the
non ETS sectors rises on average from $84/tCO2 to $266/tCO2. As a
result, the EU's welfare loss also increases 220% on average above
its level under the current EU 20–20–20 target. Fig. 6 shows that
the EU's welfare loss is around 1.24% in comparison to the
BAU level.
Under the C_rETS and S_rETS scenarios, the EU's welfare under-
goes some minor improvements. Taking into account the fairly
stable MAC levels of the ETS and non ETS sectors, this should again
be attributed to the expanding market share of the European
sectors in the domestic markets.
As the EU undergoes stricter emission controls, Turkey expands
its total production more and enjoys increasing welfare gains and
decreasing welfare losses. As seen in Fig. 7, Turkey's welfare gain
under the NOACT scenario increases to 0.30%, while the welfare
loss under unilateral abatement efforts decreases to 0.13% under
10% cap, to a range between 0.35% and 0.38% under 15% cap and
between 0.64% and 0.73% under 20% cap. The additional economic
cost arising from segmenting the regional ETS continues to prevail
since the non ETS sectors are assigned tighter emission quotas.
This is also evident from the MAC levels given inTable 8.
Our findings reveal that the underlying economic dynamics of
the C_rETS and S_rETS scenarios are pretty similar to our previous
findings under the current EU 20–20–20 targets. Nevertheless, the
economic incentives under the EU_ETS scenario occur to be
somewhat different. Fig. 6 shows that the EU improves its welfare
under the EU_ETS scenario with respect to the NOACT scenario. In
comparison to the C_rETS and S_rETS scenarios, it is still preferable
for the EU to have Turkey within the EU ETS under 10% and 15%
caps due to additional economic gains, while it results in minor
welfare losses under the 20% cap.
The reason underlying this change is that the EU starts to
import permits from Turkey due to its high abatement costs. Total
permit imports amount to 9.037 Mt of CO2 under 10% cap and
4.322 Mt of CO2 under 15% cap (Fig. 8). Nevertheless, rising
Turkey's cap to 20% increases cost burden on the Turkish ETS
sectors to $34.98/tCO2 that is above the EU ETS price level, $34.18/
tCO2. Hence, the EU finds it more profitable to export 0.406 Mt of
CO2 permits to Turkey.
As a permit exporter, Turkey's welfare loss increases under the






















Fig. 7. Welfare effects for Turkey under the revised EU 20–20–20 targets.20%, Turkey starts to import permits but this does not result in
considerable welfare improvement compared to the S_rETS
scenario. Therefore, in contrast to our previous findings, Turkey
does not have strong incentives to participate in the EU ETS due to
the associated welfare losses.5. Conclusions
In this paper we utilized a multi-regional, multi-sectoral
applied general equilibrium model to study the economic impacts
of Turkey's permit trading applications and to further investigate
the impacts under international cooperation with the EU, via the
EU ETS. Our counterfactual scenarios mainly focus on the effects of
various emission cutback requirements, the importance of market
segmentation in implementing these targets and, finally, the
effects of pursuing cooperation with the EU in carbon trading.
These scenarios are simulated for 2020 under the current EU
20–20–20 emission targets and also under the revised targets. It
should be noted that the numerical results from this comparative
static framework disregards the improvements in renewable
technology use and the use of offset credits in the permit markets.
Hence, the results should be interpreted accordingly.
In our numerical analysis, we find that Turkey suffers from
welfare losses in case of domestic abatement policies and these
losses tend to decrease when the EU applies a higher emission
reduction target of 30%. From the EU's perspective, Turkey's
engagement in domestic abatement activities is always preferable
as it enables the EU welfare gains compared to the case where the
EU continues to apply its abatement actions without any interna-
tional cooperation. As Turkey sets higher cutback ratios, the EU's
welfare gain gradually increases, due to increased competitiveness
of the European industries in the world markets.
Turkey is expected to suffer efficiency losses from market
segmentation more as the emission target increases. This is mainly
due to increasing price differential between marginal abatement
costs of sectors belonging to different market segments. Hence,
total compliance cost of meeting the same amount of cap
increases. The EU's welfare gains from Turkey's abatement actions
also diminish when market segmentation exists. This is a direct
effect of increasing marginal abatement costs of some of the
European industries due to trade linkages.
Our results indicate that the incentives for Turkey to participate
in the EU ETS depend quite much on the EU's total emission target.
Under the current EU 20–20–20 emission targets, Turkey will
unambiguously gain in comparison to its domestic abatement
actions. Since Turkey becomes a permit importer in the EU ETS
market, some of its abatement cost burden is carried by the EU. As
a result, Turkey experiences expansion in its energy and energy
intensive sectors that are integrated with the European carbon
market. Depressed marginal abatement costs of energy and energy
G.A. Olçum, E. Yeldan / Energy Policy 60 (2013) 764–774774intensive sectors have positive spillover effects on other non
energy sectors via cheaper energy prices, as well. Therefore,
Turkey becomes better off under international cooperation.
On the other hand, if the EU increases its emission target to
30%, Turkey experiences that participating in the EU ETS is more
welfare decreasing compared to the comprehensive and segmen-
ted ETSs. The composition of buyers and sellers in the EU ETS is
now changed, and the EU becomes a permit importer for low
levels of Turkey's emission reduction target. Thus, Turkey has
output losses on the one hand, and auctioning revenues on the
other, being dominated by the former effect. As Turkey increases
its target to 20%, the EU initiates exporting permits to Turkey.
However, the improving effect of this change on Turkey's welfare is
quite minor and is dominated by the increasing cost burden on the
Turkish non-ETS sectors.
As our analysis further reveals, the European Union has welfare
gains out of Turkey's domestic mitigation actions due to increased
competitiveness of its industries in the world markets. Under the
current EU 20–20–20 emission targets, the EU loses some of these
welfare gains when Turkey integrates with the EU ETS. As opposed
to this, under the revised EU 20–20–20 targets, the EU finds it
more welfare improving that Turkey's regional ETS integrates with
the EU ETS. In comparison to the current situation where Turkey
has not yet taken any abatement action, the EU unambiguously
favors that the Turkish ETS links with the EU ETS and the volume
of the permit market enlarges. The magnitude of net gains from
linkage highly depends on the structural parameters of Turkey's
permit trading scheme, i.e. the level of the emission target and its
distribution across the sectors. As our analysis reveals, the EU ends
up with less welfare gains from linkage as Turkey's mitigation
target increases. Hence, the question of how much burden that the
Turkish authorities will put on the ETS sectors is highly critical and
is open to a controversial public debate.Acknowledgments
We benefited from valuable comments and suggestions from
Ebru Voyvoda, Selin Sayek Böke, Çağrı Sağlam and participants of
the macroeconomic workshops at Bilkent. We also acknowledge
the very careful and diligent critical comments of the two unan-
imous referees of this Journal. Gökçe Akın Olçum would further
like to thank Christoph Böhringer for his invaluable guidance on
economic modeling techniques and gratefully acknowledges the
support of The Scientific and Technological Research Council of
Turkey (TUBITAK) for their Graduate Fellowship Program.
References
Akin Olcum, G., 2012. Market-based environmental regulation in the post-Kyoto
world: analysis of Turkey's action plan in general equilibrium framework (Ph.d.
thesis). Bilkent University, unpublished.
Anger, N., 2008. Emissions trading beyond Europe: linking schemes in a post-Kyoto
world. Energy Economics 30, 2028–2049.
Anger, N., 2009. Linking the EU emissions tradings scheme: economic implications
of allowance allocation and global carbon constraints. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob
Change 14, 379–398.Armington, P.S., 1969. A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of
production. Imf Staff Papers/International Monetary Fund (International) 16 (1),
159–178.
Aydin, L., Acar, M., 2010. Economic and environmental implications of Turkish
accession to the European Union: a CGE analysis. Energy Policy 38, 7031–7040.
Babiker, M., Reilly, J., Viguier, L., 2004. Is international emissions trading always
beneficial? Energy Journal 25, 33–56.
Badri, N.G., Walmsley, T.L., 2008. Global trade, assistance, and production: the GTAP
7 Data Base. Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.
Baron, R., Bygrave, S., 2002. Towards international emissions trading: design
implacations for linkages, OECD Information Paper. OECD, Paris.
Bernard, A., Vielle, M., 2009. Assessment of European Union transition scenarios
with a special focus on the issue of carbon leakage. Energy Economics 31,
S274–S284.
Blyth, W., Bosi, M., 2003. Linking non-EU domestic emissions trading schemes with
the EU emissions trading scheme, Environment Directorate International
Energy Agency.
Böhringer, C., Loschel, A., Moslener, U., Rutherford, T.F., 2009. EU climate policy up
to 2020: An economic impact assessment. Energy Economics 31, S295–S305.
Bohringer, C., Rutherford, T.F., 2002. Carbon abatement and international spillovers
—A decomposition of general equilibrium effects. Environmental & Resource
Economics 22, 391–417.
Böhringer, C., Rutherford, T.F., 2010. The costs of compliance: a CGE assessment of
Canada's policy options under the Kyoto protocol. World Economy (UK) 33 (2),
177–211.
EIA, 2010. International Energy Outlook. U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Washington, DC.
European Commission, 2008. The Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package,
Europe's climate change opportunity. 〈http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/pack
age/index_en.htm〉.
European Commission, 2009. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and
the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance trading Scheme of the Community. L140/
63, Official Journal of the European Union.
European Commission, 2012. The state of the European carbon market in 2012.
Eyckmans, J., Hagem, C., 2011. The European Union's potential for strategic
emissions trading through permit sales contracts. Resource and Energy Eco-
nomics 33, 247–267.
Haites, E., 2001. Linking domestic and industry greenhouse gas emission trading
systems. Prepared for Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), International
Energy Agency (IEA) and International Emissions Trading Association.
IEA, 2011a. CO2 emissions from fuel combustion: a new basis for comparing
emissions of a major greenhouse gas. IEA statistics, p. v. OECD, Paris, France.
IEA, 2011b. Economic indicators. Energy Projections for IEA Countries. International
Energy Agency, Paris, France.
IEA, OECD, 2011. Energy balances of OECD countries. p. v. OECD, Paris, France.
IMF, 2012. World economic outlook: Growth resuming, dangers remain. World
Economic And Financial Surveys. International Monetary Fund, Washington,
DC.
Kumbaroglu, G.S., 2003. Environmental taxation and economic effects: a compu-
table general equilibrium analysis for Turkey. Journal of Policy Modeling 25,
795–810.
Lee, H., Oliviera-Martins, J., Van der Mensbrugghe, D., 1994. The OECD Green
model: an updated overview.
Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, 2011. National climate change action
plan. 〈http://iklim.cob.gov.tr/iklim/Files/IDEP/%C4%B0DEPENG.pdf〉.
Montgomery, W.D., 1972. Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control
programs. Journal of Economic Theory 5, 395–418.
Paltsev, S., Reilly, J.M., Jacoby, H.D., Eckaus, R.S, McFarland, J., Sarofim, M.,
Asadoorian, M., Babiker, M., 2005. The MIT emissions prediction and policy
analysis (EPPA) model: version 4. The MIT Joint Program on the Science and
Policy of Global Change, Cambridge, MA.
Rutherford, T.F., 2011. GTAP7inGAMS package.
Telli, C., Voyvoda, E., Yeldan, E., 2008. Economics of environmental policy in Turkey:
a general equilibrium investigation of the economic evaluation of sectoral
emission reduction policies for climate change. Journal of Policy Modeling 30,
321–340.
Vural, B., 2009. Tracing the second dividend in environmental policies: a CGE
application to Turkey (M.A. thesis). Bilkent University, unpublished.
World Bank, 2012. State and trends of the carbon market. World Bank, Washington,
D.C..
